





a theoretical and empirical review
Thomas Ericson
WORKING PAPER 2005:1 
     
The Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation (IFAU) is a research insti-
tute under the Swedish Ministry of Industry, Employment and Communica-
tions, situated in Uppsala. IFAU’s objective is to promote, support and carry 
out: evaluations of the effects of labour market policies, studies of the function-
ing of the labour market and evaluations of the labour market effects of meas-
ures within the educational system. Besides research, IFAU also works on: 
spreading knowledge about the activities of the institute through publications, 
seminars, courses, workshops and conferences; creating a library of Swedish 
evaluational studies; influencing the collection of data and making data easily 
available to researchers all over the country. 
 
IFAU also provides funding for research projects within its areas of interest. 
There are two fixed dates for applications every year: April 1 and November 1. 
Since the researchers at IFAU are mainly economists, researchers from other 
disciplines are encouraged to apply for funding. 
 
IFAU is run by a Director-General. The authority has a traditional board,   
consisting of a chairman, the Director-General and eight other members. The 
tasks of the board are, among other things, to make decisions about external 
grants and give its views on the activities at IFAU. A reference group including 
representatives for employers and employees as well as the ministries and   
authorities concerned is also connected to the institute. 
 
Postal address: P.O. Box 513, 751 20 Uppsala 
Visiting address: Kyrkogårdsgatan 6, Uppsala 
Phone: +46 18 471 70 70 





Papers published in the Working Paper Series should, according to the IFAU policy, 
have been discussed at seminars held at IFAU and at least one other academic forum, 
and have been read by one external and one internal referee. They need not, however, 
have undergone the standard scrutiny for publication in a scientific journal. The pur-
pose of the Working Paper Series is to provide a factual basis for public policy and the 
public policy discussion. 
 
 
ISSN 1651-1166 IFAU – Personnel training: a theoretical and empirical review  1 








26 May, 2004 
Summary 
This report provides an introduction to personnel training (on-the-job training) 
literature in the economics field. Theoretical models dealing with the initiation 
of training programmes and their effects on pay at the individual level are 
discussed, and empirical research on wage effects is reported. In addition, there 
is an overview of sources of data and the extent of personnel training in the EU 
and the United States.  
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1 Introduction 
The development of skills, know-how and expertise (competences) in working 
life has attracted increasing attention in the labour-market research field. This 
area covers everything from leave of absence for study or organized in-com-
pany training programmes to personal experience and informal contacts with 
colleagues and fellow workers. This review of the literature in this field focuses 
on skills development in the “employment” context which is wholly or partially 
financed by the employer. In the following, the term personnel training, or 
simply training, is used to cover this. 
The purpose of this review is to examine the theoretical and empirical 
research on the effects of personnel training at the individual level, and it is 
confined to personnel training in industrialized western countries. There is a 
special focus on the situation in Sweden, and this is compared with that in other 
countries. The empirical results concentrate on the impact of training on the 
employee’s pay at the individual level. The impact on employee productivity 
and the company’s performance is not analysed in detail in this study
1. 
This review starts with an analysis of the factors that distinguish personnel 
training from other activities performed on a daily basis by employers and 
employees. This is followed by an account of traditional human capital theory 
and its predictions about the effects of personnel training at the individual 
level. The manner in which institutional factors in the labour market can affect 
training is discussed in this connection, and in particular the part played by 
trade unions. The next stage is presentation and discussion of the data on which 
many of the empirical studies are based. The extent of personnel training and 
the factors involved are described. Finally, a picture of how personnel training 
appears to affect the employee’s pay levels is presented, based on theoretical 
predictions and the empirical data. 
 
 
                                                      
 
1 See Hansson, Johansson & Leitner (2003) for an overview of the impact on company 
performance. See Bartel (2000) for an overview of employee productivity. IFAU – Personnel training: a theoretical and empirical review  6 
2 Theoretical  starting  points 
2.1  Special characteristics of personnel training 
Pigou (1912) presents one of the first economic analyses of training and skills 
development in working life. He noted that, if the employee changed jobs and 
moved elsewhere, the employee’s improved expertise would be transferred to 
other employers thus benefiting other employers but not the employer who had 
financed the training. 
 
“Under a free economy … since workpeople are liable to change employers, 
and so to deprive investing [employers] of the fruits of their investment, the 
private net product is apt to fall considerably short of the social net product. 
Hence, socially profitable expenditure by employers in the training of their 
workpeople … does not carry a corresponding private profit.” (Pigou, 1912, 
p 153) 
 
Thus, personnel training gives rise to a positive external effect, since the 
employer’s private return is less that the value of the training investment to 
society as a whole. 
The construction of a new hydroelectric plant is a classic textbook example 
of a positive external effect because it benefits production in existing power 
facilities downstream. Hence, a positive (negative) external effect occurs if a 
company’s production or the benefits for individual citizens increase (decline) 
due to activities undertaken by other companies or individuals, providing that 
such activities are not bought or sold in a market. There is an essential 
difference, however, between the hydroelectric plant example and personnel 
training. The power facility’s positive external effect on power stations 
downstream does not reduce the power company’s willingness to invest, 
providing the power company does not want to avoid benefiting a competitor 
for strategic reasons. In contrast, the employer’s willingness to invest in 
personnel training is inhibited by the advantages that other employers may 
obtain from the programme. This is clearly because the value of the power 
company’s investment in the power facility is not diminished by the positive IFAU – Personnel training: a theoretical and empirical review  7 
external effects, while this is clearly the case if there is no return on the 
employer’s investment in personnel training
2. 
Hence, the reason that the positive external effects of training inhibit the 
willingness to invest is because employees hold ownership rights over their 
expertise. Marshall (1920) noted that, in contrast with physical capital, an 
employer cannot own the employee’s skills: 
 
“ … whoever may incur the expense of investing capital in developing the 
abilities of the workman, those abilities will be the property of the workman 
himself: and thus the virtue of those who have aided him must remain for the 
greater part its own reward.” (Marshall, 1920, p 565) 
 
The possibility that other employers can benefit from investment in per-
sonnel training made by another employer is referred to as a poaching exter-
nality
3. This means that the employer’s investment in personnel training is 
inhibited on the grounds of the employee’s ownership of his or her skills, and 
the possibility that other employers may utilize the employee’s recently acqui-
red skills and know-how by recruiting the employee after completion of 
training programme. 
In other words, ownership of the employee’s skills and know-how cannot be 
bought or sold in a market, since a market of this type would involve serfdom 
and slavery. The employee’s know-how capital is dependent on premises, 
equipment, trademarks and customer relationships which are the property of 
the employer. Without these tangible and intangible assets, the investment in 
human capital will often be of little economic value. The mutual dependence of 
the employee’s and the employer’s assets mean that personnel training is 
integrated with pay issues and other conditions of employment. Studies of 
personnel training inevitably involve studies of contractual conditions of 
employment. 
                                                      
 
2 Pigou added that the positive external effects are reduced in cases where production calls for a 
specialized labour force whose skills cannot be used by other employers. As a result, according 
to Pigou, employers’ investment in training should be more common in workplaces of this 
nature. 
3 Cf poaching game or fish. IFAU – Personnel training: a theoretical and empirical review  8 
A further factor that distinguishes investment in personnel training from 
tangible or physical investment is that the labour market’s evaluation of the 
employee’s know-how may differ from the value placed on it by the parties 
responsible for an investment in training. In other words, the investment is 
relation-specific. Physical investments may sometimes also be relation-speci-
fic, for example investments in various stages of production in the manufactu-
ring process. In this case, however, ownership rights can be reallocated as a 
result of mergers and takeovers, and the company’s profit potential can be 
assessed on the stock market. On the other hand, the labour market’s evaluation 
of the employee’s know-how capital is inevitably based on the employee’s 
switch from the original environment in which the investment took place. The 
labour market’s evaluation of the investment will only comply with the value 
set on it in the workplace concerned if the personnel training programme is of a 
totally general nature, with universal application. 
An additional factor, which follows from the two previous conditions, is 
that the training programme must be financed by the employee and/or the 
employee’s current employer. Restrictions on the ownership of the employee’s 
know-how makes it impossible to pledge this asset as collateral with a credit 
institute. Furthermore, the market value of the investment is subject to 
inadequate information about the employee’s skills in the labour market. 
As a result, these factors mean that personnel training is a complex invest-
ment, affecting the employee’s pay structure, productivity, security of employ-
ment and other terms of employment. The literature in the economics field 
discusses how training affects conditions of employment and how conditions of 
employment affect incentives for training. 
 
2.2 Human  capital  theory 
 
2.2.1  The basic model: general and specific investment 
Recent research in the personnel training field usually takes Becker’s (1962, 
1964) pioneering work on human capital investments
4  as its starting point. 
Becker’s definition of Human capital investment is that investment in human 
                                                      
 
4 See also Schultz (1961), Mincer (1962) and Oi (1962). IFAU – Personnel training: a theoretical and empirical review  9 
capital consists of activities that affect future real income as a result of the 
acquisition of personal resources by human beings. As a result, it should be 
noted that training is only one of several possible activities which may have an 
impact on the individual’s human capital. These activities range from school 
education to physical training and a healthy diet, which promote good health. 
Becker’s analysis focused on training (on-the-job training) because this activity 
indicated particularly clearly how investments in human capital affect incomes, 
productivity, forms of employment and other economic variables. 
Becker made a key distinction between general  and  specific training. 
General training may be applied by all employers who may decide to recruit 
the employee concerned, while specific training only enhances the employee’s 
productivity in the workplace concerned
5. This distinction had a major impact 
on subsequent literature in the field, and is still debated. Different 
consequences are predicted for future income and security of employment, 
depending on whether the training programme is general or specific. 
 
2.2.2  Impact on pay 
The basic assumption in Becker’s analysis is a labour market subject to perfect 
competition. Neither the employer nor the employee has sufficient influence in 
the labour market to affect the employee’s market wage or salary. All parties 
concerned are risk-neutral and have access to identical information about the 
employee’s productivity. In a model in which personnel training is excluded, 
equilibrium occurs when the employee’s wage rate is equal to the value of 
employee’s marginal product in the workplace. If the employer establishes a 
level of wage rate which is less than the employee’s marginal product, a 
competitor may offer higher wage rate and thus succeed in recruiting the 
employee. If, on the other hand, the employee demands higher pay than his or 
her marginal product, other employees would be prepared to work for lower 
                                                      
 
5 However, the distinction between general ability and specialized ability was already noted by 
Marshal (1920), p 207: “We may then use the term general ability to denote those facilities and 
general knowledge and intelligence which are in varying degrees the common property of all 
grades of industry: while that manual dexterity and that acquaintance with particular materials 
and processes which are required for the special purposes of individual trades may be classed as 
specialized ability”. IFAU – Personnel training: a theoretical and empirical review  10
pay. Parity between the employee’s marginal value and the employee’s wage 
rate means that the employer cannot make a profit. 
Personnel training affects this equilibrium since it introduces an investment 
cost and expectations about future revenues. The investment cost consists of 
reduced production while the employee is involved in training activities instead 
of performing normal work assignments (indirect costs), and also expenditure 
for travel, course materials and course fees, etc. (direct costs). Expected future 
revenues consist of improved productivity in the workplace as a result of the 
investment in training. Once again, perfect competition in the labour market 
means that the employer cannot profit. In an equilibrium situation, over time 
the employer’s total marginal revenues resulting from personnel training will 
be equal to the employer’s total marginal costs, taking into account a given 
discount rate. However, in contrast with the previous situation, the employer’s 
marginal revenue may differ from wage costs in specific time periods. This 
deviation of marginal revenue depends on whether the personnel training 
programme is general or specific. 
According to Becker, a rational employer will not provide general personnel 
training unless the employee personally defrays the cost. Since general abilities 
have the same value, both in the outside world and in current employment, the 
market rate of pay and the employer’s remuneration costs will increase after 
conclusion of the training programme. As a result, only the employee will be 
prepared to pay for general personnel training. This may be stated as follows: 
 
General personnel training leads to lower initial wages and a more rapid 
rate of pay increase compared with similar work with no personnel-training 
element. 
 
Hence, Pigou’s theory under which the positive external effects of personnel 
training lead to inefficient training programmes in working life is contradicted 
by Becker’s model, under which the employee makes an efficient investment 
since he/she receives the full return on the investment as a result of an 
improved market wage. Thus, according to Becker, the fact that the employer 
cannot own the employee’s general human capital does not give rise to any 
form of inefficiency.  
The outcome is different in the case of specific training, since the 
employee’s productivity only increases in the workplace in question. This 
means that the employer and the employee expose themselves to a risk - if IFAU – Personnel training: a theoretical and empirical review  11 
employment is terminated after the training programme, there will be no return. 
The employer and the employee share this risk by sharing the cost of training 
and future revenues. Becker’s intuitive explanation is that it could be initially 
assumed that the employer pays the entire cost of training and receives the 
entire return on the training investment. But if the employee changes jobs after 
completion of training, the employer’s return is zero. In order to increase the 
employee’s incentive to continue in his employ after completion of training, the 
employee will pay part of the training cost but will also receive part of the 
return. If, on the other hand, the employee pays the entire training cost and 
receives the entire return, the employee would run the risk of losing the return 
as a result of dismissal after completion of training. The parties’ propensity to 
continue the employment relationship is maximized if investment costs and 
revenues are shared. The formal proof underlying this conclusion is presented 
by Hashimoto (1981). We would claim that: 
 
Specific personnel training results in lower pay initially and a more rapid 
rate of pay increases compared with equivalent tasks with no training, 
although to a lesser degree than would be the case for general training 




2.2.3  Why should employers finance general personnel training? 
Fundamental human capital theory assumes that the employer will defray all 
costs relating to general training, but will also receive all the financial benefits 
generated by skills-training in the form of increased pay. This establishes the 
prerequisites for a utility-maximizing individual to choose the efficient volume 
of personnel training, in which the employee selects general training that 
ensures that the marginal investment cost is equivalent to the marginal 
expected future revenue. In the case of specific training, the employer and the 
employee will instead maximize the expected return by sharing the investment 
cost and the expected revenues. IFAU – Personnel training: a theoretical and empirical review  12
But, in practice, the employer normally pays part of the cost for general 
personnel training, despite the fact that the return is controlled by the 
employee. What is the explanation for inefficient personnel training of this 
nature?
6 
Perhaps the most obvious reason for payment of general training by the 
employer is that the employee has limited opportunities to finance his/her share 
of the training costs. No doubt, the employee could apply for a bank loan, but 
in this case the bank would require collateral in the form of a property 
mortgage or securities. The employee may have no such securities, or own 
securities representing insufficient collateral. The employer, on the other hand, 
may often be in a position to pledge the company’s plant, properties, etc. In 
addition, the bank will require a rate of interest that exceeds the corresponding 
interest rate for the employer. 
The difference in interest rates is due to asymmetry in information between 
the bank and the employee as regards the employee’s risk propensity and the 
prerequisites for repayment of the loan. Presumably, the employer is better 
informed about the employee’s possibilities of achieving higher productivity 
after the training programme, and hence repayment of a loan to the employer is 
a safer proposition, with a lower rate of interest.
7 
In the light of this, it is rational to let the employer act as a credit institute on 
the employee’s behalf by giving the employee higher pay during the training 
period than the low rate of remuneration that would be required to pay training 
costs in full, and then postpone the subsequent pay increase. As a result, 
general personnel training and the employee’s limited liquidity lead to a 
                                                      
 
6 This inefficiency can take three different forms. Firstly, personnel can receive training, but to 
an inadequate extent. Secondly, training may be confined to an inadequate proportion of the 
personnel, and thirdly personnel may receive the wrong type of training. In order to simplify the 
arguments, no distinction is made between these three forms of inefficiency. 
7 In addition, the bank may be unwilling to offer the employee credit in any form. Stiglitz & 
Weiss (1981) describe the way in which a restricted credit market occurs as a result of the 
lender’s inadequate information about credit risks. A higher level of interest would attract 
borrowers with a high risk propensity and encourage high-risk investments, but this would 
reduce the lender’s expected return. As a result, the interest level is less than the level at which 
supply and demand are in equilibrium in the credit market. Instead, bank lending is limited by 
refusing to grant loans for certain purposes. Loans for human capital investments are a clear 
example of an area of this nature. IFAU – Personnel training: a theoretical and empirical review  13 
remuneration pattern which is similar to that for specific personnel training. 
However, in contrast with specific training, the employer is exposed to the risk 
of losing the return on the investment in general personnel training if the 
employee resigns. This risk calls for a risk premium which reduces the 
employee’s investment in general training to a level which is lower than the 
employee would choose if he/she was able to borrow from the bank at the same 
rate of interest as the employer. 
Asymmetry of information in the labour market is another reason for 
financing of general personnel training by the employer. The improvement in 
the employee’s skills is often not sufficiently clear to other employers. As a 
result, the employee will not receive the full social value of the investment in 
training if he/she changes jobs. New employers will receive benefits that are 
not reflected in terms of the price in the labour market, due to asymmetry of 
information between employers and the employee’s level of general know-
how.
8 This reduces the employee’s incentives to invest in general training. 
Barron, Berger & Black (1999a) pose the fundamental question of why the 
parties concerned do not take steps to avoid asymmetry of information between 
current and potential employers regarding the contents of the training 
programme by implementing certification and course documentation specifying 
the training completed by the employee. Why not issue diplomas in the same 
manner as for upper secondary and university education? In this context, the 
authors denote a fundamental difference between secondary and higher educa-
tion and personnel training. In school and university education, the employee is 
in the best position to determine the occupational focus and future income 
potential, in line with his/her personal prerequisites. Students select the course 
programmes in which they wish to participate, and they finance their 
participation by means of grants, loans or savings. In the case of personnel 
training, however, the employer is normally in the best position to identify 
skills requirements in the workplace, and to envisage potential gains as a result 
of investment in personnel training. Barron, Berger & Black consider that the 
employer has a paramount role to play in matching the employee with the 
optimum training programme. This raises the question of what makes the 
employer get involved in planning suitable training for employees. Apparently, 
                                                      
 
8 See Bishop & Kang (1996) and Bishop (1997), p 60. IFAU – Personnel training: a theoretical and empirical review  14
the absence of certification of completion of personnel training is the factor that 
guarantees the employer’s commitment. The reasons are as follows. 
The employment contract between the employer and the employee is 
regarded as a principal-agent relationship when considering the planning of 
training programmes and the matching of employees with programmes.  The 
employee is the principal who assigns his agent, the employer, to plan and 
choose the best training strategy. The asymmetry of information between the 
employer and the employee gives rise to some problems, however. The em-
ployee cannot be certain of the extent to which the employer is genuinely 
involved in finding the optimum personnel training programme. As a result, the 
employee must undertake to reward the employer in a credible manner and 
share the return on the training investment when the employer presents the 
most advantageous training option. Barron, Berger & Black wonder if such a 
promise can be credible in the case of general training. Once the optimal 
training has been conducted and the employee has received a higher market 
wage, it will be rational for the employee to abandon the original agreement 
concerning sharing the gains. 
In the principal-agent relationship literature, the standard solution for this 
problem of incentives is that the principal sells the assets and means of produc-
tion which provide ownership of the difference between the gain/profit and the 
investment cost to the agent, thus making the agent a “residual claimant”. 
However, in the case of personnel training, this is impossible since the sale of 
human capital would be equivalent to slavery. The principal (the employee) 
must, in accordance with established legal principles, own the asset concerned 
(human capital). According to Barron, Berger & Black, the solution is to con-
vert general training into specific training. This is achieved by actively hiding 
the content of the training programme from other employers, or by forming the 
course content in a manner which restricts its utilization in other workplaces. 
The result is that certification of personnel training is of no interest. By 
replacing general personnel training with a specific variant, the employee can 
undertake, with credibility, to compensate the employer’s investment in the 
matching and planning of the personnel training activity concerned. This model 
thus continues to be based on a labour market subject to perfect competition. 
Instead, the focus is on the contractual difficulties which lead to the specific 
training programme chosen by the parties concerned, together with the 
resultant consequences for future remuneration. 
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2.3  Imperfect competition in the labour market 
2.3.1  A compressed wage structure 
Several theories which explicitly take into account imperfect competition in the 
labour market have been presented in the 1990s. Transaction costs and 
imperfect competition place the employer in a stronger position in pay 
negotiations with the employee. The employee can negotiate a level of pay 
which is less than the employer’s marginal product in the workplace. As a 
result, the wage level will increase more slowly than the value of the marginal 
product after training – in other words there is a compressed wage structure in 
relation to the employee’s skills and know-how. In its turn, this implies that the 
employer has incentives to finance general training, irrespective of possible 
liquidity problems on the part of the employee or other contractual problems.
9 
In addition, this compressed wage structure means that personnel training 
gives rise to positive external effects, since other employers can utilize 
investments in training made by the employer concerned without paying higher 
wages/salary, thus restoring the relevance of Pigou’s (1912) original theory – 
the positive external effects of personnel training and imperfect competition in 
the labour market mean that neither the employer nor the employee receive the 
overall societal benefits (revenue) of personnel training. The employee does 
not receive a pay increase which corresponds to the increase in productivity. In 
turn, the employer receives a marginal increase in revenue after personnel 
training which is lower than the employee’s marginal increase in productivity. 
This is due to three factors: 
 
(i)  The employee’s market wage rises after personnel training, even if it 
rises at a slower rate than the employee’s productivity in the workplace. 
(ii)  The employee may demand part of the surplus created between the value 
of the marginal product and the market wage, depending on the relative 
negotiation strength of the employer and the employee. 
(iii)  The employee will tend to terminate his/her employment, with a certain 
degree of probability. 
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Hence, it may be established that personnel training is probably inefficient. 
The reasons for this inefficiency are open to interpretation. According to 
traditional human capital theory, the employer’s incentives for financing 
general training diminish due to contractual problems between the 
employer/employee.
10 According to institutional theory, the employer’s 
incentive to finance general personnel training is instead reduced by the three 
factors (i)-(iii) listed above. 
 
2.3.2  Positive external effects of personnel training 
There are number of possible reasons why personnel training gives rise to posi-
tive external effects. Information asymmetry between employers and the em-
ployee’s general level of skills and know-how is one possible reason, since the 
employee’s higher productivity is not fully reflected in the market wage.
11 The 
employee’s costs for looking for new employment (search costs) also give the 
current and the potential employer an advantage in pay negotiations, enabling 
them to exploit the employee’s general know-how.
12 Burdett & Smith (1996) 
discuss an additional form of external effects, in which the employee’s and the 
employer’s search costs in a recruitment context are taken into account. In this 
model, the employee and the employer negotiate pay, taking into account their 
respective alternative incomes in the event of breakdown of negotiations. If 
employees embark on on-the-job training, the employer’s access to skilled 
labour increasees which, in its turn strengthens the employers’ negotiation 
position on pay issues. This results in a lower level of pay, thus reducing the 
employees’ expected return from training. Thus, personnel training generates a 
matching externality as a result of the employee’s reduced expected return on 
the investment. 
It should be added that the positive external effects of personnel training 
may also benefit the current employer. In the case of further training of 
personnel in various forms of information and communications technology 
(ICT) – for example the utilization of e-mail, the Internet and the company’s 
                                                      
 
10 See Section 2.2.3. 
11 The concept of the significance of asymmetrical information for imperfect competition and 
employers’ financing of general personnel training was introduced by Chiang & Chiang (1990), 
Katz & Ziderman (1990) and Chang & Wang (1996). 
12 Se Acemoglu (1997). IFAU – Personnel training: a theoretical and empirical review  17 
intranet – improved communications within the company will give rise to 
revenues that exceed the employees’ higher productivity at the individual level, 
thus creating network externalities. The financing of ICT personnel training 
will be paid for by the employer, since only the employer can coordinate the 
necessary training measures, due to asymmetry between employees and their 
employer regarding the best ways of enhancing productivity in the workplace 
as a result of ICT. The employer also benefits from the network externality of 
personnel training. If the employee was to pay for training, this would be on an 
inadequate and inefficient scale. This type of positive external effect provides a 
further explanation of the reason for the employer’s financing of general 
personnel training. The normal source of inefficiency occurs when an employer 
finances general personnel training involving skills which can benefit other 
employers. The employee’s higher market wage and the increased risk of 




2.3.3  The complementary characteristics of personnel training 
Other reasons for the financing of general personnel training by employers are 
based on the complementary relationship between general training and other 
investments or activities undertaken by the employer or the employee These 
complementary investments/activities increase the return on general training. 
But if these complementary elements are not reflected in the market price, 
perfect pricing of personnel training will not be achieved. 
 
Specific personnel training 
Acemoglu & Pischke (1996b) show that if specific personnel training increases 
the marginal return of general training in the workplace, training which 
                                                      
 
13 See Bishop (1997), p 61-62. 
14 Training can also give rise to positive external effects for society as a whole. An innovation or 
improved performance in the workplace as a result of regular personnel training activities 
increases the consumer surplus for all consumers who pay the same price, irrespective of the 
product’s quality. An extreme case is an airline pilot who manages to land a damaged passenger 
plane safely as a result of recurrent simulator training. Also small quality differences which the 
consumer does not notice and which, as a result, are not reflected in the price can often be traced 
to differences in the scope of personnel training. See Bishop (1997), p 60-61. IFAU – Personnel training: a theoretical and empirical review  18
contains both specific and general elements will increase employee’s 
productivity more rapidly than his/her market wage. This gives the employer a 
stronger position in future pay negotiations, thus encouraging the employer to 
finance general training. The continuing sources of inefficiency are the 
employee’s negotiating strength in future pay negotiations and the risk that the 
employee, nonetheless, resigns.
15 
Another reason for financing by the employer and the associated ineffici-
ency, is that certain types of general know-how represent a specific 
combination for the company concerned.
16 This may, for example, involve the 
ability to cope with a given combination of computer software. Other 
employers may be able to benefit from each software program, per se, but the 
particular combination of programs is only used at the specific workplace 
concerned. 
Stevens (1996) stresses that, on the whole, know-how tends to be neither 
completely general not fully specific, in the manner assumed in fundamental 
human capital theory. She considers that, instead, the employee’s know-how is 
more or less transferable to other employers. This gives rise to imperfect 
competition in the labour market, in which competing employers gain if they 
recruit trained personnel. 
 
The employee’s capacity 
The efficiency of personnel training is also affected by the employee’s capacity 
and prerequisites for the acquisition of new know-how and expertise. The 
complementary relationship between further training and individual capacity 
leads to an information advantage for the employer regarding the value of 
personnel training, compared with other potential employers. The current em-
ployer is more aware of the employee’s capacity and, as a result, the em-
ployee’s wage rate will be lower that the value of his/her marginal product. As 
a result, other employers are faced with a selection problem which the current 
employer can exploit in determining the rate of pay. Acemoglu & Pischke 
(1998) show that the lower market wage probably reduces the likelihood that 
the employee will terminate his/her employment after completion of the 
                                                      
 
15 See factors (i)-(iii) above. 
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training programme, and that this encourages the employer to provide general 
training programmes. 
Malcomson, Maw & McCormick (2000) indicate that an apprenticeship 
system may be justified on the basis of the supplementary relationship between 
personnel training and the employee’s capacity, and also the difficulty of 
specifying in advance in the employment contract what the employee’s on-the-
job training should include. Even if undertakings are made about what the 
employee is to learn, in practice it is impossible for an outsider to find out 
whether or not the contract has been fulfilled. Hence both sides can deviate 
from the contract without risking repercussions in a court of law. In contrast, an 
apprenticeship system may provide credible guarantees that the employee’s 
training programme will be fulfilled. The parties can commit themselves in 
advance to a high rate of pay after completion of training, and they can decide 
how long the training period should be. Continued employment after the 
apprenticeship period gives other employers a clear signal that the employee/-
apprentice has a genuinely high capacity, since the employer has no reason to 
retain apprentices with a low capacity at a high rate of pay. Hence, apprentices 
with a high capacity are guaranteed a higher market wage after completing 
their training, and they will therefore accept a lower initial rate of pay during 
the apprenticeship period. 
Autor (2001) indicates that a similar mechanism may be at work in general 
training programmes in manpower companies. The manpower company 
provides computer training free of charge, despite the fact that the employee 
will move on elsewhere. But training gives better results for people with a high 
capacity, and this means that the manpower company can offer training at a 
limited rate of pay which only attracts the most suitable employee categories. 
People with lower capacity do not find it worthwhile to complete the training 
programme since their future pay will probably fail to match that of the most 
talented staff. This selection process is beneficial for employers who are 
customers of the manpower company and, as a result, the manpower company 
can charge the employer a fee which corresponds to the cost of personnel 
training. 
 
The employee’s commitment and efforts 
In addition to the employee’s individual capacity, training is also influenced by 
the employee’s degree of commitment and effort in the training investment 
process. If the employee knows that he/she will receive the entire return from IFAU – Personnel training: a theoretical and empirical review  20
training, commitment is hardly a problem. Once again, it is the limited ability 
of the employment contract to specify future events in a credible manner which 
gives rise to problems in the incentive area. Employees cannot be certain that 
they will be rewarded for their participation and involvement in personnel 
training, and the employer cannot be certain that the employee will make a 
genuine effort. These uncertainties lead to a mutual need for reliable promises 
and undertakings – for example a guaranteed minimum wage rate after 
completion of training, as discussed by Loewenstein & Spletzer (1998). A pay 
guarantee can be monitored by outsiders and, as a result, it is a credible 
undertaking. The employer is prevented from recouping a future surplus which 
should actually be allocated to the employee. In addition, a pay guarantee 
ensure that the internal wage structure is compressed – in other words the level 
of pay will have a lower degree of correlation with individual productivity, thus 
giving the employer incentives for financing general training. 
The wage structure can also be compressed to safeguard the employee’s 
degree of commitment in line with efficiency-wage theory. Acemoglu & 
Pischke (1996b) show that if the level of pay after personnel training is below a 
certain level, the employee will have an incentive to shirk in the workplace, 
notwithstanding the risk of discovery and possible dismissal. A specified rate 
of pay guarantees the employee’s efforts. The compressed internal wage 




The employee’s incentive to invest in personnel training may also be affected 
by the extent to which the employer invests in machinery and new technology. 
These strategic considerations may be channelled via the complementary 
relationship between human capital and physical capital. Acemoglu (1996, 
1997) analyses a model in which the employee’s human capital (H) and the 
                                                      
 
17 Acemoglu & Pischke (2000) show that the certification of apprenticeship programmes can 
increase the employer’s involvement in the programme in a corresponding manner. 
18 It may be noted that the problems linked with the employee’s hidden commitment (moral 
hazard) lead to a compressed wage structure in the workplace, in contrast with imperfect 
competition in the labour market, which results a compressed wage structure between 
workplaces.
 However, if other employers in the labour market have a similar pay structure, the 
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physical capital (K) are part of the company’s production function (F), in 
which F = (H, K) and there is technical complementarity between H and K, so 
that F12(H, K) > 0. Imperfect competition in the labour market reduces the 
employee’s private return as a result of personnel training, resulting in a 
reduction in the investment in H.
19 In its turn, a reduction in the investment in 
H reduces the company’s return on capital investment, K. Reduced capital 
investment results in reduced scope for wages, since F is declining. Hence the 
complementary relationship between H and K leads to a strategic decision 
regarding a commitment to personnel training – the employee reduces 
(increases) his/her investment in training when the employer’s level of 
investment declines (increases). As a result, economies with similar technology 
and institutional structures may wind up with different levels of know-how and 
growth rates, due to accidental circumstances or differences in the original 
assets in capital and training systems. 
 
2.4 Trade  unions 
The employee’s membership of trade union organizations is one of the 
institutional factors that affects personnel training. There are theoretical argu-
ments suggesting that union membership both hinders and encourages invest-
ment in personnel training. 
According to fundamental human capital theory, the employee pays for 
general personnel training in the form of lower remuneration during the 
training period. The employee has an incentive to implement the investment as 
a result of the expected increase in pay after completion of the training 
programme. Mincer (1983) considers that trade union pay agreements in which 
pay is established in line with the length of employment instead of individual 
                                                      
 
19 Imperfect competition in the labour market is modelled by assuming that the employee 
receives a proportion β  (0 < β <1) of production, while the employer receives a proportion which 
is (1 – β). The employer chooses Ke to maximize (1 – β)F(He, K) – rK, in which r is the cost of 
capital, while the employee chooses he to maximize βF(H, Ke) – c(H), in which c(H) is the cost 
of training. This results in the equilibrium condition (1 – β)F2(He, Ke) = r and βF1(He, Ke) = 
c’(He), which produces lower levels of K and H than in a market with perfect competition. In a 
labour market with perfect competition, the employee’s level of training is determined by the 
market wage w, so that w = c’(H*). In this case, the equilibrium is determined by levels of K and 
H that maximize F(H, K) – rK – wH, resulting in the equilibrium condition F2(H*, K*) = r and 
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performance reduce the employee’s incentive to invest in general training. On 
the other hand, trade union membership results in reduced flexibility for the 
company among its employees, thus increasing the employer’s incentive to 
invest in specific training. Hence, fundamental human capital theory indicates 
that the impact on the extent of personnel training is determined by the balance 
between reduced pay dynamics and longer periods of employment. 
The outcome of this process depends on the factors governing the actions of 
the trade union. The traditional theoretical assumption is that the union follows 
majority decisions, thus maximizing the benefits for the median member. 
According to Grossman (1983), pay will be established at a level which balan-
ces the median member’s utility resulting from increased pay with the risk of 
dismissal due to low profitability. Since the median member has greater 
security of employment than new employees, the increase in utility for older 
employees is achieved at the expense of their younger colleagues. 
Ways in which this conflict of interest between different generations in the 
workplace may affect personnel training is discussed in more detail by Weiss 
(1985). Weiss assumes a model based on two generations of employees: older 
and younger. The older employees can influence requirements for the training 
of younger employees and, in practice, this is a tool which enables older em-
ployees to influence the recruitment of new employees, and their productivity 
and level of pay. In addition, the union sanctions transfers from the younger 
generation to the older in the form of a pay system based on seniority, 
minimum wages for new employees, priority rules in the event of redundancy 
and different work schedules. Weiss shows that, if there is no limit on these 
transfers between younger and older employees and there are no restrictions 
regarding the size of younger employees’ transfer payments, the long-term 
level of personnel training for younger employees will meet the model’s 
efficiency criteria. If, on the other hand, transfers are limited in view of the 
ability of younger employees to make transfer payments, the older employees 
will require inefficiently protracted and demanding training for younger 
employees. Training may be excessively extensive, for example, making 
irrelevant demands on school education requirements, with long waiting 
periods for examinations, long apprenticeships and a high proportion of 
examination failures. The reason why the older generation insists on this type 
of inefficiency and excessively high educational standards is that, where 
restrictions apply, they can only increase transfers from younger employees by 
increasing the number of younger employees in the workplace. In order to IFAU – Personnel training: a theoretical and empirical review  23 
avoid pressure on levels of remuneration from a greater number of younger 
employees due to the increased supply of labour, the older employees will 
introduce high educational and training requirements in order to reduce the 
younger generation’s productivity during the training period. 
Barron, Fuess & Mark (1987b) point out that Weiss’ model may result in 
lower educational and training requirements by older trade union members. 
The only modification required is to specify the restriction for transfers from 
younger employees to older employees as a minimum wage floor. This means 
that older employees can increase transfers from their younger colleagues by 
raising their current productivity in the workplace. This increased productivity 
is achieved if younger employees devote less time to l training and more time 
to their normal work. Thus, the older employee’s strategy for increasing their 
incomes is to reduce younger employee’s work contribution, thus increasing 
the scope in terms of pay for older employees to increase the work input by 
younger employees and redistribute increased productivity to older employees. 
Barron, Fuess & Mark consider that this model mainly applies to occupations 
in which older employees can influence training requirements for younger 
employees (for example doctors). In other occupational areas, with lower 
requirements for experience and specialist expertise, older employees may be 
afraid that they will be replaced by younger trainees with lower pay and higher 
productivity. In this case, the union’s strategy is to lift trainee pay rates to a 
minimum level in order to reduce competition from younger employees. 
Thus, the presence of trade union organizations may reduce the supply of 
general training due to union minimum wage for new employees and personnel 
employed on a temporary basis. As a result, the employer will not pay for 
general training in exchange for low initial rates of pay. 
But trade union membership can also encourage training. Reduced mobility 
due to increased redundancy costs will increase the employer’s incentives to 
invest in firm-specific training. Freeman & Medoff (1984) consider, in 
addition, that union membership gives employees an opportunity to express 
dissatisfaction with working conditions (a voice), instead of “voting with their 
feet” and leaving the company (exit). In situations in which employees can 
express their views on equal terms in negotiations, the employer will be in a 
better position to draw up a personnel policy which will reduce staff turnover. 
A more stable relationship between the employer and employees will reduce 
the risk that the employer’s investment in personnel training benefits other 
employers. In its turn, a reduced poaching externality increases the employer’s IFAU – Personnel training: a theoretical and empirical review  24
propensity to finance both general and specific personnel training. The fact that 
the median union member is less inclined to change his/her employment than 
new employees is a further argument for increased personnel training with 
union participation. In negotiations between the trade union and the employer, 
the union will represent median members and, if a balance between specific 
training and other benefits and improved working conditions is to be achieved, 
the median member’s preferences will have greater priority than those of new 
employees. Since the median member has a long expected employment period, 
the parties in the negotiation will give priority to specific training rather than 
other benefits which might be preferred by new employees and other less 
permanently established employees. In line with this theory, Boot & Chatterji 
(1998) demonstrate in a model that union participation in pay negotiations 
reduces the likelihood that the employee will change jobs, and this results in 
increased personnel training. 
Acemoglu & Pischke (1996b) emphasize that trade union pay negotiations 
establish the necessary compressed wage structure which guarantees a return 
on general training for the employer. Hence, general personnel training may be 
more efficient, due to the union’s ability to separate pay issues from the volume 
of training. Booth, Francesconi & Zoega (2002) present an alterative 
explanation in which central trade union agreements at the industry level for 
both pay and personnel training permit the allocation of the surplus from 




3  Sources of data 
3.1  Measuring personnel training 
The collection of data about personnel training calls for questionnaire surveys, 
since information about training is seldom recorded in a register format.
20 
Questionnaires can be directed both to the employee, with questions about 
                                                      
 
20 There are exceptions in the personnel databases for individual companies to which researchers 
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training programmes completed recently in a given period or employment, and 
to the employer, with questions concerning the extent of personnel training in 
the workplace. 
Certain fundamental characteristics of the training programme should be 
taken into account if the quality of this data is to be analysed in greater detail. 
(See Figure 1) Training may either take place in the workplace (on-site 
training) or elsewhere (off-site training). In some cases, the questionnaires 
distinguish between these forms of training. If training takes place in the 
workplace, this may, in its turn, be in a formal format (courses, seminars, etc.) 
or in an informal context (instructions from fellow employees, etc.) The 
definition of these formats may vary from one questionnaire to another. Some 
questionnaires make no distinction between formal and informal training, while 
others exclusively target formal personnel training. Finally, training may be 
general, specific, or a combination of the two. There are questionnaires in 
which the questions are formulated in a manner designed to clarify this, while 
other questionnaires leave this aspect open. 
In addition, questionnaire surveys may have different sample populations. 
For the most part, the questions are directed to participants in the private sector. 
This is often quite natural, since the assumption about profit-maximizing 
companies is a cornerstone in human capital theory. In addition, questionnaire 
surveys often have to choose between workplaces with a limited number of 
employees or major workplaces, and breaking down the data by the employee’s 
gender and age-group or by his/her level of education. 
 
A further difference between questionnaires is the reference period for the 
training in question. Questions may focus on current training, but they are 
normally posed retrospectively, covering previous training during a given 
period – in which the length of the period is also inclined to vary. In addition, 
the questionnaire may be confined to current employees, or it may include 
previous employees. 
The results of questionnaires targeted at employees differ to some extent 
from those addressed to employers. Recent surveys match employers and IFAU – Personnel training: a theoretical and empirical review  26
employees in an attempt to evaluate these differences. However, initially our 
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Figure 1 Chart depicting the characteristics of personnel training 
3.2  Questionnaires addressed to employees 
Table 1 depicts a selection of the commonest sources of data based on 
questionnaire surveys addressed to employees. 
Duncan & Hoffman (1979) is a pioneering study which uses the Panel Study 
of Income Dynamics (PSID) to analyse ways in which training influences wage 
and salary developments. The question posed in PSID does not provide direct 
information about whether the individual in question is currently participating 
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in, or has participated in, some form of personnel training and, in this case, how 
long the training has continued. Instead, a “Whether Training for Current Job” 
variable is constructed by comparing the stated time required for an average 
person to be fully trained, and the period of employment for the person 
concerned. If the period of employment is less that the period for full 
acquisition of skills, it is assumed that the person concerned is participating in 
some form of personnel training. Several other household-based questionnaire 
surveys have been modelled on PSID. The question about how long it takes for 
an average person to be fully skilled is included in the Swedish Household 
market and non market activities (HUS) survey, for example, and there is a 
similar question in the Swedish Levnadsnivåundersökningen (LNU) standard of 
living survey.  
The National Longitudinal Survey (NLS) was one of the earliest surveys 
which asked employees direct questions about training in their current jobs. 
Respondents who stated that they had participated in training were asked about 
the longest type of training in which they had been involved since the previous 
interview. The location of training and its structure were broken down into 
three alternatives: 
(i)  In- company schools or courses, 
(ii)  Business, technical and vocational schools, 
(iii)  Traditional schools, colleges and universities. 
 
In other words, the questions primarily focused on formal training, which 
might be located either in the workplace or elsewhere. 
Several subsequent surveys using panel data contain questions about per-
sonnel training since the last interview took place, for example the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), the European Community Household 
Panel (ECHP), the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and the Swedish 
Arbetskraftsundersökningar  (AKU) labour force surveys. Cross-section 
surveys employ a variety of periods for retrospective questions about training 
programmes completed. The Current Population Survey (CPS) covers the 
period since the respondent started his/her most recent job. The French Enquête 
sur la Formation et la Qualification Professionelle (FQP) is interested in the 
last five years and the British Social Attitudes Survey (BSAS) in the last two 
years, while the Swedish Undersöking av levnadsförhållanden (ULF) living 
conditions survey focuses on the three previous years. There are also panel data 
surveys that specify a period which is not related to the previous interview. The IFAU – Personnel training: a theoretical and empirical review  28
National Longitudinal Survey of the High School Class of 1972 (NLSHS72) 
specifies the period since the respondent started his/her most recent job, while 
the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) asks about the most recent three-
year period. 
All these surveys, with the exception of BHPS, BSAS, FQP and ULF, ask 
whether training has taken place in the workplace or elsewhere. The British 
BHPS survey asks whether the reason for personnel training was: 
(i)  Introduction to present job, 
(ii)  Skills improvement in current job, for example by learning new 
technology, 
(iii)  Preparation for future jobs, 
(iv)  Development of skills in a general sense. 
 
These alternatives provide some indication of where the training took place – 
alternative (i) probably occurs at the place of work, while alternatives (ii) – (iv) 
are likely to take place elsewhere, to a large extent. There are no alternatives in 
BSAS, FQP and ULF which might provide some guidance. 
Most surveys only report formal training, mainly due to the manner in 
which the questions are formulated and the absence of alternative answers re-
flecting more informal types of training. There are exceptions, however, in 
CPS, BSAS, NLSHS72 and NLSY from 1993. CPS asks what training and 
education was required to get the job in question, and what training is required 
to improve skills in the current job. In this context, the location and structure of 
the training programme is broken down by: 
•  in-company schools and courses, 
•  traditional schools and universities, 
•  informal training in the current job, 
•  informal training and experience in the previous job which were required 
to get the current job. 
 
BSAS asks whether the respondent has participated in some form of informal 
training by: 
•  being asked to perform some task simply to get experience and learn the 
task in question, 
•  someone talking about the work or providing training, 
•  being placed with more experienced personnel to see how the job should 
be done, IFAU – Personnel training: a theoretical and empirical review  29 
•  being shifted between different departments to see the work they do, 
•  being asked to read certain materials in order to learn the job, 
•  being taught by someone else in connection with the performance of 
tasks. 
 
In NLSHS72, training is broken down into: 
•  apprenticeship positions, 
•  training in working hours in premises in the workplace, 
•  informal training (e.g. working alongside someone who instructs and 
demonstrates), 
•  training in working hours outside the workplace, 



































































Table 1 Questionnaires about personnel training addressed to employees 




Data collection method The questions  Key studies 
Study of Income 
dynamics (PSID) 
US 
Panel data, nationally 
representative sample, 
men and women aged 
18-64 who worked at 




Approx. 5 000  Interviews with the main 
household provider. 
Separate interviews with 
both men and women in the 
case of married couples. 
“On a job like yours, how long would 
it take the average new person to 
become fully trained and qualified?” 








Panel data, young men 
and women aged 14-
24, women aged 30-44 
and men aged 45-59 in 
1996. 
1967 -1981  Approx. 3 000  Interviews at intervals of 1, 
2 or 5 years. 
”Do you receive or use training (other 
than schooling training) on your job?”
“What was the longest type of training 
you have had since the last 
interview?” 
Mincer (1983)  








tive sample, private 
sector employees aged 
25-64. 
1983, 1991  Approx. 10 000 Supplementary interviews 
for continuous surveys  
“What training was needed to get the 
current or last job and what training is 
needed to improve skills on the current 
job?” (1983) 
“Since you obtained your last job, did 
you take any training to improve your 
skills?”(1991) 
Lillard & Tan (1992) 
National 
Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth 
(NLSY) 
US 
Panel data, men and 
women aged 14-22 in 




1979 -  12 686 (1979)  Annual interviews 1979-
1994, subsequently every 
other year. 
“In addition to your schooling, 
military and government-sponsored 
training programs, did you receive any 
other types of training for more than 
one month?” (1979 – 1986) 
Lynch (1992) 
Veum (1993, 1999) 
Loewenstein & 








































































Data collection method The questions  Key studies 
National Longi-
tudinal Survey of 
the High School 
Class of 1972 
(NLSHS72) 
US 
Panel data, graduated 
from high school 
1971-72, with a full-
time job between 1979 
and 1986. 
1986  22 652 (1972) 
12 841 (1986) 
Interviews in 1979, 
subsequently 5 follow-up 
interviews. Included 
questions about training in 
1986. 
”Considering the most recent full-time 
job you have held, did you receive or 
participate in any type of employer-
provided training benefits or 
programs?” 








tive sample from EU 
countries. 
1994 -   Approx. 80 000 Interviews organized at the 
national level, joint 
questionnaire for all 
countries. 
”Have you at any time since January 
been in any vocational education or 
training, including part-time and 
short-courses?” 
Brunello (2002)  
Bassanini & Brunello 
(2003) 
Enquête sur la 







men and women aged 
20-64. 
1993  Approx. 18 000 Interviews in 1964, 1970, 
1977, 1985 and 1993. 
“Have you participated in any 
employer-provided training programs 
between the beginning of 1988 and the 
beginning of 1993?” 
Hocquet (1999) 





Panel data, nationally 
representative sample, 
men and women aged 
16-64. Immigrants 
from Turkey, Italy, 
Spain, Greece and 
Yugoslavia are 
overrepresented. 
1989  Approx. 4 500  Annual interviews since 
1984. Included questions 
about training in 1989. 
”There are various possibilities for 
work-related training. Thinking about 
the past three years, for your own job 
related education, have you read books 
and journals, participated in 
conferences and congresses, or 
participated in work related courses?”















































































sentative sample.  
1987  Approx. 1400  Interviews  “In the last two years, have you 
been on any courses or had any 
other formal training, which was 











1991 -  Approx. 
10 000 
Annual interviews since 
1990. More detailed 
questions about training 
introduced in 1998. 
”Have you taken part in any other 
training schemes or courses at all 
since September 1
st last year or 
completed a course of training 
which led to a qualification?” 
Booth & Bryan 
(2002) Booth, 
Francesconi & Zoega 
(2003) 
Household 









91, 93, 96, 
98 
Approx. 2500  Interviews with the main 
household provider. 
Separate interviews with 
both men and women in 
the case of married 
couples. Included ques-
tions about training in 
1984. 
”On a job like yours, how long 
would it take the average new 











sample, men and 




Approx. 6 800  Interviews. Included 
questions about training 
in 1991 and 2000. 
”Apart from the competence 
necessary to get a job such as 
yours, how long does it take to 
learn to do the job reasonably 
well?” 
Regnér (2002)  













































































Rotating panel data, 
1/8 of panel repla-
ced every quarter, 
nationally represent-
tative sample, men 
and women aged 16-
64. 
1986 -   Approx. 
13 000  
Monthly interviews. 
Questions about training 
once a year, as from 
1999 every 6 months  
”During the last 6 months, did you 
participate in any education, 
conference or seminar that was 
totally or partly paid by your 
employer/your company?” 
If No: 
”During the last 6 months, did you 
participate in any course, been 
taught by a supervisor to do new 












sample, men and 
women aged 16-84. 
1974 -  Approx. 7 500  Personal interviews. 
Detailed questions about 
training during the 
period 1994-1999 and in 
2002. 
”Have you, during the past 3 
years, taken part in on-the-job 
training with your current or 
earlier employer that, counted full 
time, lasted at least one week? 
With on-the-job training we mean 
training that is arranged or 
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3.3  Questionnaires addressed to employers 
An alternative strategy for determining the scope of personnel training is 
questionnaires addressed to employers. Two well-known US surveys – the 
Employment Opportunity Pilot Project (EOPP) and the Small Business Survey 
(SBA) - should be mentioned in this context. 
EOPP focuses on training for the company’s average new employees. As 
indicated in Table 2, questions relate to the volume of personnel training during 
the first three months of employment. The first question concerns formal 
training, while questions 2-4 involve informal training. The purpose of the final 
question is to ascertain the extent of human capital required for the employee’s 
job. 
The EOPP sample involves overrepresentation of low-income groups, and is 
targeted at workplaces benefiting from the federal grants programme. In 
addition, if the average new employee almost certainly had a job subject to 
high labour turnover, training for other positions in the company will 
presumably be longer and more extensive. In contrast, the SBA survey employs 
a representative sample of companies, and is supplemented by questions about 



































































Table 2 Questionnaires about personnel training addressed to employers 












Employers at 23 
different locations in the 
US participating in 
Employment 
Opportunity Pilot 





”During the first three months of work, what was the total 
number of hours spent on formal training, such as self-
placed learning programs or training done by specially 
trained personnel?” 
 
”During the first three months…number of hours 
management and line supervisors spent away from other 
activities giving informal individualized training or extra 
supervision?” 
 
“During the first three months…number of hours co-
workers who are not supervisors spent away from other 
activities giving informal individualized training or extra 
supervision?” 
 
“During the first three months of work, how many total 
hours does the average new employee spend in training 
activity in which he or she is watching other people 
rather than doing it himself or herself?” 
 
“How many weeks does it take a new employee for (X) 
type of position to become fully trained and qualified…?”
Barron, Black & 
Loewenstein (1987a) 
























































































Corresponding to EOPP + a question on the number of 
hours the average new employee received training outside 
the workplace during the first three months. 
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3.4 Methodological  problems 
3.4.1 Differences  between  employee and employer information 
Barron et al (1997a) report an American study (the Upjohn Survey,1993) which 
posed identical questions on personnel training and other market-related varia-
bles (pay, experience, etc.) to both employers and the “last worker hired”. 
Approximately 300 companies and employees were interviewed out of a 
national sample of 5,000 companies. In order to improve the likelihood of 
encountering a new employee, there was a requirement that the company must 
have had at least 100 employees. 
It appears that there are considerable differences between employers’ and 
employees’ information regarding the length of training. The correlation 
between the employer and the employee information is less than 0.5 for the 
aggregate quantification of personnel training in this survey. This is an 
abnormally low correlation compared with that achieved for other labour-
market variables. Similar results occur for formal and informal training. The 
differences in comparison with the aggregate score are even more marked in 
the case of more specific measures. It is worth noting that employers tend to 
report more hours than employees (in about 25% of cases). Employers also 
report a longer period for inexperienced employees to be fully trained l. The 
difference between employers’ and employees’ estimates of the time required 
to be fully skilled (correlation 0.17) are even greater than estimates of the 
length of personnel training. It may nonetheless be noted that employees and 
employers indicated similar incidence of training – in other words a similar 
number of participants in personnel training. 
Barron et al investigated whether the differences between employers’ and 
employees’ results might have been due to individual characteristics on either 
side. They found a significant negative correlation between employers’ 
information about employee levels of education and the difference in 
information about the total number of training hours. In other respects, the 
discrepancy between the number of personnel training hours stated appears to 
be independent of other variables and, as a result, the differences between 
employer and employee information is probably simply due to measurement 
problems as regards an accurate statement of the number of hours devoted to 
training during the first month of employment. As a result, there is an obvious 
risk that regression analyses of the impact of personnel training on employee 
pay, for example, will lead to skewed parameter estimates, since the  
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independent variable in the regression equation (training) becomes stochastic, 
and thus may be correlated with the error term in the equation. 
 
3.4.2  The distinction between general and specific personnel training 
The 1993 NLSY questionnaire included a question about the general and 
specific features of the personnel training programme, with the following 
wording: “How many of the skills that you learned in this program do you 
think could be useful in doing the same kind of work for an employer 
DIFFERENT than [the current employer]?”. Of those who said that they had 
completed a training programme, 63% selected the “all or almost all” 
alternative, 14% opted for “about half of the skills”, while only 11% indicated 
“less than half of the skills” or “none or almost none of the skills”. This 
indicates that employees regarded a considerable proportion of the training 
programme as general.
22 
A comparison with Swedish data reveals a similar pattern. The 1991 LNU 
poses the following question: “Do you know any other employer where you 
could have considerable advantage of what you have learnt in your present 
job”. In this case, 48% of employees in the private sector answered “Yes, 
several” to this question, 8% said “Yes, one or two”, and 16% gave a negative 
response.
23 In 1994-1998, the ULF survey asked whether “the training 
programme (= the most recent internal programme) can be used with another 
employer?” and “Can the training programme (= the most recent internal 
programme) be used in a number of different industries?”.  5% gave a negative 
response to the first question, thus indicating that they considered that the most 
recent internal training programme was specific, while 54% gave a positive 
response to the second question, which indicates that they considered that the 
most recent internal training programme was of a general nature.
24 
EOPP provides information about how general or specific training 
programmes are. The question addressed to employers is as follows: “How 
many of the skills learned by new employees in this job are useful outside of the 
company?” 58% responded “almost all”, 24% said “most”, 20% indicated 
                                                      
 
22 Loewenstein & Spletzer (1996b) present a more detailed analysis. 
23 See Regnér (2002). 
24 See Evertsson (2004).  
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“only some”, and 8% answered “none”. In confirmation of the NLSY, LNU 
and ULF surveys, the employer also regarded the major proportion of 
personnel training as of a general nature. To summarize: 5-20% of the 
respondents in these surveys regard training as clearly specific.
25 
The AKU statistics give quite a different picture. The 2001 personnel 
training questionnaire asked if “the course/training programme was mainly 
company-specific or general?”, and three alternative response options were 
presented:  “Mainly company-specific”,  “Mainly general” and “Partly com-
pany-specific and partly general”. 48% replied: “Mainly company-specific” 
for all the courses in which they had participated during the previous six-month 
period
26. This figure may be compared with the equivalent assessment of the 
LNU survey (16%). This may well be because respondents to the AKU survey 
did not understand the meaning of “company specific”, as defined in human 
capital theory. Another explanation may be the formulation of the questions 
about personnel training in the various surveys. As indicated in Table 1, the 
question in AKU focuses on formal training, while the LNU question asks how 
long it takes to learn the job, on average. Given a broader definition of the 
learning process in the workplace, as in the LNU survey, it is not surprising 
that a smaller number of respondents considered that the know-how they have 
acquired could not be used by other employers. On the other hand, if learning 
in the workplace is confined to formal courses and seminars, more respondents 
will say that their know-how is “company-specific”, even if it may well be 
viable with another employer. A clearer formulation of the AKU question 
would have been desirable. 
 
 
                                                      
 
25 Regnér (2002) states that more women than men receive specific personnel training (22% 
compared with 15%), and that the proportion receiving specific training is higher in the public 
sector (21%). 
26 See Ericson (2004).  
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4  How much, and for whom? 
4.1  Incidence and intensity 
Table 3 shows the percentage of employees who participated in training, 
according to five US surveys. Column 2 indicates that 17% of the sample in 
CPS and 28% in NLS72 had participated in training during their current 
employment. The proportion who had received training during the last 12 
months was 17% according to NLSY and, in the first three months as new 
employees 15% (EOPP) and 21% (SBA). Notwithstanding the brief reference 
period, the incidence of training in EOPP, SBA and NLSY is comparable with 
the scores in CPS and NLS72. This is particularly noteworthy in the light of the 
broader definition of training in CPS and NLS72, since formal school 
education is included as a response option, while school education is excluded 
in EOPP, SBA and NLSY. As indicated in the following discussion, one 
contributory factor may be that there is a younger sample population in NLSY 
compared with the representative sample in CPS, and the fact that EOPP and 
SBA only cover new employees. 
In Column 3, we see that that the information about informal personnel 
training varies significantly between the various surveys. Questionnaires 
addressed to employers (EOPP and SBA) indicate a considerably higher pro-
portion of informal training (approx. 95%), compared with employee surveys 
in which the incidence of informal training is 15-20%. One explanation may be 
that the employer regards instructions to employees as a form of informal 
training, while employees regard it as general supervision and normal 
instruction. In addition, Loewenstein & Spletzer (1999a) point out that the 
response options for informal training in CPS and NLS72 are in the form of 
follow-up questions, after questions about formal training. As a result, these 
questionnaires ignore people who have only received informal training since 
they cannot continue to answer the questionnaire because they have not 
received any formal training. In the 1994 NSLY survey, on the other hand, all 
new employees were asked whether they had received some form of informal  
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personnel training during their first year of employment, and roughly 80% 
considered that they had participated in some form of informal training
27. 
Column 4 shows the percentage who received training outside the 
workplace. The new employees in the SBA survey received a relatively low 
proportion of external training, but the proportion was higher in NLS72. This is 
probably because external personnel training involves expenditure for new 
employees which the employer does not wish to pay, in view of uncertainties 
regarding the duration of their employment and their productivity. 
Overall, the US questionnaire surveys suggest that approximately 45% of 
the employees had received training at one time or another during their current 
employment, and that roughly 15% had received training during the preceding 
year. These surveys also indicate that informal training is very common among 
new employees, with figures of around 80% according to employees, and 95% 
according to employers. 
 
                                                      
 
27 See Loewenstein & Spletzer (1999a) for further details.  
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Table 3 The incidence of personnel training 
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  15 %   88 % (manager) 
63 % (co-worker) 








98 %  21 %  91 % (manager) 
60 % (co-worker) 
65 % (watching 
others) 
7 % 
1 Loewenstein & Spletzer (1999a) 
2 Bishop (1997) 
3 Altonji & Spletzer (1991) 
4 Barron, Berger & Black (1997b) 
 
The intensity of training that has taken place is stated in Table 4 in terms of the 
average number of hours. Both CPS and NLS72 indicate that 8-10 weeks on 
average were devoted to personnel training in the current job. EOPP and SBA 
suggest that, on average, training represented roughly half the new employee’s 
time during the first three months of employment, and that this time was 
divided between formal and informal training on a relatively evenly distributed 
basis.  
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Table 4 The intensity of personnel training, average number of hours for 
training that has taken place 
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1 Loewenstein & Spletzer (1999a) 
2 Bishop (1997) 
3 Altonji & Spletzer (1991) 
4 Barron m fl (1997b) 
 
According to AKU, 46% of employees participated in personnel training 
during the first 6 months of 2003
28. The proportion of participants in Sweden is 
                                                      
 
28 See Statistics Sweden press release No. 2004:075.  
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much higher than the US figures, since AKU does not take informal training 
into account. The average intensity of training also appears to be higher in 
Sweden – the average intensity during the first six months of 2003 was 6.1 
days per individual according to AKU, compared with a similar number of 
days in a 12-month period in NLSY. 
The 1996 Eurobarometer posed the following question: “Did you receive 
any education or training in the last five years paid for by your employer or by 
a former employer?” 40% of employees in the EU’s 15 member states (EU15) 
had received training of this nature
29. There was considerable variation between 
the EU countries, and the Nordic countries headed the list with 60-70% 
participation in personnel training. In countries in southern Europe – Italy, 
Greece, Portugal and Spain – only 20-30% of employees had participated in 
training. See Figure 2.) 
 
Figure 2 Proportion of employees who participated in personnel training during 
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29 See Gallie (1997).  
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All  Men Women
< 1 week 1-4 weeks  1 months
40,5  40,9 39,8
 
 
4.2  Who receives personnel training? 
Table 5 summarizes the way in which specific employee characteristics 
influence the likelihood that the employee will receive personnel training, 
according to some key studies. The personal characteristics that reduce the like-
lihood of training are the employee’s age, period of employment and non-
native ethnic background. The negative impact of the employee’s age and 
duration of employment are in line with the theory that a shorter period of 
return reduces willingness to invest in training. As a result, the age and 
employment-time factors, per se, will restrict the employer’s willingness to 
make financial sacrifices to achieve higher future income. Similarly, the em-
ployer’s incentives to finance and organize personnel training will decline in 
the light of the employee’s relatively advanced age and experience of the 
assignments concerned. Some studies indicate that women tend to receive less 
training than men, mainly because women have jobs with lower expertise 
requirements. On the other hand, other studies indicate that women receive 
more training, due to more positions entailing recruitment outside the 
workplace. 
It is interesting to note that, in the EU15 countries, female employees 
receive a higher proportion of training with a duration of less than a week (see 
Figure 3, above). In contrast, men have a higher proportion of training ranging 
from one week to four weeks and training lasting more than a month. There is a  
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similar pattern for non-native ethnicity, since a higher proportion of employees 
with a non-native background have jobs with lower requirements in terms of 
formal qualifications, and this tends to reduce the volume of training. 
Specific factors in Table 5 which increase the employee’s training include 
working hours, formal education, the size of the workplace and the complexity 
of job assignments. It is not unreasonable to assume that longer working hours 
and increased presence in the workplace result in greater responsibilities and, 
as a result, greater incentives for personnel training. The correlation between a 
higher level of formal education and the volume of training is in line with the 
theoretical hypothesis that education and training give an indication of the 
individual’s abilities and future productivity. Studies also indicate that major 
workplaces provide more training than small companies, possibly because 
training is used to screen the employee’s capacity and skills. Large companies 
appear to invest in formal training and informal training by colleagues, while 
small companies tend to use managers to assess the employee’s abilities
30. As 
already mentioned, there is more personnel training in jobs involving complex 
assignments. The 1996 Eurobarometer statistics (Figure 4) indicate, for 
example, that 60.7% of the Professionals and managers occupational group 
had received training during the previous five years, while the corresponding 
figure for the Elementary occupations group was only 18.3%. 
 
                                                      
 
30 See Bishop (1997).  
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Finally, in Table 5 we can see that the impact of experience of working life on training is 
unclear. On the one hand, an experienced employee needs less training while, on the other 
hand, employers appear to recruit experienced employees for jobs involving more complex 
tasks, and this calls for more personnel training.  
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Table 5 Specific impacts of the likelihood of receiving personnel training 
  Impact on the likelihood 
of receiving personnel training 
Studies 
Age  ( - )  Booth (1991)  
Barron m fl (1997a) 
Working hours  ( + )  Bishop (1991)  
Barron m fl (1997a) 
Length of 
employment  
( - )  Bishop (1997)  
( - )  Barron m fl (1987b)  Working life 
experience  ( + )  Barron m fl (1997a) 
Education  ( + )  Barron m fl (1987b)  
Booth (1991)   
Barron m fl (1997a) 
Size of workplace  ( + )  Barron m fl (1987a)  
Booth (1991) 
Holtmann & Idson (1991) 
( - ) 
 
Altonji & Spletzer (1991)  
Olsen & Sexton (1996) 
Sicilian & Grossberg 
(2001) 
Woman 
( + )  Veum (1996) 
Non-native 
ethnicity 
( - )  Lynch (1992)  
Veum (1993) 
Booth (1991)  
Barron m fl (1997a) 
Complex job 
assignments 
( + )  Booth (1991)  
Bishop (1997) 
 
The specific impacts indicated in Table 5 are confirmed by the correlation 
between participation in personnel training and characteristics of the labour 
force in Sweden. Table 6 shows the proportion of employees who received 
training during 2001, according to AKU. The proportion with personnel 
training was less than half for part-time employees with less than 20 hours a 
week. This proportion was more than double in the case of employees with a 
significant period of studies in higher education, as compared with people with 
only basic education. The size of the workplace is also of major importance – 
the training proportion was almost double in workplaces with more than 1,000 
employees compared with workplaces with 9 or fewer employees. However, in 
contrast with the EU15 statistics, a higher proportion of women than men 
participated in training, probably due to higher female participation in the  
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labour force in Sweden compared with other EU countries. In addition, 
employees born outside the Nordic region had a roughly 25% lower rate of 
participation in training. Finally, as in the EU15 study, the incidence of training 
appears to be lower for less responsible posts and less complex tasks. 
 
Table 6 Participation in personnel training in Sweden according to AKU 
   Participation  in 
personnel training, % 
Working hours   Full-time 62.5 
  Part-time  
(20-34 hrs. per wk.) 
52.0 
  Part-time  
(1-19 hrs. per wk.) 
22.9 
Education  Compulsory school less than 9 yrs.  37.3 
  Compulsory school 9 yrs.  38.4 
  Senior secondary school max. 2 yrs  55.9 
  Senior secondary school more than 2 yrs.  54.5 
  Higher education less than 3 yrs.  71.7 
  Higher education more than 2 yrs.  79.55 
  Post-graduate education  78.9 
Size of workplace  -9 36.1 
  10-49 48.1 
  50-99 53.0 
  100-249 57.7 
  250-499 63.0 
  500-999 66.0 
  1,000 -   68.8 
Gender  Men 56.5 
  Women 60.5 
Place of birth  Sweden 59.5 
  Other Nordic countries  56.8 
  Non-Nordic countries  44.1 
Occupational category  1.  Legislators, senior officials and 
management 
76.0 
  2.  Professionals   79.4 
  3.  Technicians with brief higher  73.1  
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   Participation  in 
personnel training, % 
education 
  4.  Clerks, administration and 
customer service 
54.8 
  5.  Service, care and sales  51.2 
  6.  Agriculture, gardening, forestry 
and fishing 
34.8 
  7.  Craft and related trade workers  44.1 
  8.  Plant and machine operation, 
transport, etc. 
42.0 
  9.  Elementary occupations  27.9 
  10.  Military 79.2 
 
 
5  Impact on pay 
5.1 Theory 
In principle, human capital theory assumes a labour market in perfect 
competition, in which factor prices are adjusted to an equilibrium level without 
any entrepreneurial profit, and at wage levels equal to the value of employee’s 
marginal product. Inefficiency in the personnel training context are attributed 
to difficulties for the investing parties to regulate the training component within 
the framework of the employment contract. There are several reasons for this: 
the employee’s limited liquidity, which hinders the financing of general 
training, the uncertain return on the investment, and the fact that the investment 
cannot be covered by insurance due to adverse selection and moral hazard, 
information asymmetry regarding the improvement in the employee’s skills, 
and the difficulty of specifying training and credibly undertaking to implement 
it. 
An alternative line of the literature focuses on a labour market characterized 
by imperfect competition, as a result of institutions and regulations, 
information asymmetry, transaction costs and a limited number of employers. 
This takes account of the employer’s personnel-training initiatives to a greater 
extent. A pay structure which, for various reasons, is not perfectly correlated 
with the employee’s productivity results in a profit margin for personnel 
training for the employer. Inefficiency is said to be due to the fact that the  
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employee’s market rate of pay is nonetheless influenced by the investment in 
training. In addition, the employee can negotiate on the difference between the 
marginal product and the market rate of pay since the training investment is 
relation-specific and the employer’s revenue will diminish if the employee 
leaves the company. The fact that other employers can take advantage of the 
differential between the employee’s marginal product and rate of pay leads to 
the inefficient generation of positive external effects as a result of personnel 
training. The difficulties experienced by parties to the investment in privatizing 
the return on the training investment are the main reason for this inefficiency. 
Table 7 summarizes the various theoretical predictions about pay trends in 
the personnel training context. Column 1 indicates that the employer and the 
employee share the costs in all models, with the exception of Model 1 and 
Model 5. In Model 1 (perfect competition and general training) the employee 
will pay the entire cost of training, since the wage is less than both the 
employee’s marginal product during the training period (MPt) and the 
employee’s marginal product with no training (MP0). In Model 5 (imperfect 
competition and general training), the employer, in contrast, pays the entire 
cost of training, since MPt is lower than Wt and Wt is equal to the pay which 
the employees would receive without training (MP0). 
Column 2 indicates pay after the implementation of training. In all models 
except Model 1, the employer and the employee share the return on personnel 
training. In Model 1, the employer receives the entire return, since pay is equal 
to the marginal product. In other models, the employer receives a proportion of 
the return when MPt+1 exceeds Wt+1 . 
Column 3 demonstrates the major difference between the models in Table 7 
by indicating the impact of training on pay in other jobs. In Model 1, the wage 
has an identical impact on other employers’ wage, due to the assumption of 
perfect competition and general personnel training. In Model 2, training will 
have a greater impact on other employers’ pay-rates, where there is perfect 
competition and general personnel training, but with participation in financing 
by the employer. As a result, the employer will expect to receive part of the 
return, and Wt+1 will be less than Wt+1*. The employee’s temptation to change 
employer after training in order to receive the higher Wt+1* acts as a constraint 
on the investment propensity of the current employer, and is one of the reasons 
for inefficiency. In Model 3, training has no impact on other employers’ rate of 
pay since training is assumed to be specific, thus eliminating the source of 
inefficiency in Model 2. However, there are other sources of inefficiency in the  
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case of specific personnel training as a result of difficulties in arriving at a 
credible agreement concerning the future allocation of revenues. In Model 4, 
the impact on other employers’ wages will be less than the impact in the 
current workplace, since the training programme is both specific and general. 
There is an upward pressure on wages with other employers, however, as a 
result of the general training component, but the specific component means that 
pay increases will be less with other employers. Finally, Model 5 results in 
higher or equal wage increases for other employers due to the assumption about 
the current employer’s stronger negotiating position in a pay context. 
 
Table 7 Summary of the impact of personnel training on rates of pay in 
accordance with various economic models 
Model (1) 




Wage (Wt+1) after 
personnel training 
(3) 
Impact on wage in other 















MPt < Wt < MP0 MP0 < Wt+1 < MPt+1 MP0 = Wt+1* < Wt+1 
(4) 
Perfect competition, 
both specific and 
general training 





MPt < Wt = MP0 MP0 < Wt+1 < MPt+1 MP0 < Wt+1 ≤ Wt+1* 
MP0 = value of the employee’s marginal product with no personnel training 
MPt = value of the employee’s marginal product during personnel training 
MPt+1 = value of the employee’s marginal product after personnel training  
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5.2 Empirical  model 
The most general linear empirical model for the impact of personnel training on 
















3 2 1 ε µ γ β β β δ α
 (1) 
Pijt are the variables indicating the existence and extent of personnel training 
for an individual i in a job j and with t years of employment. Pijt is summarized 
over t = 1, …, T in order to arrive at the impact of cumulative training in the 
current job. 
Pik  are variables indicating the individual i ‘s total volume of personnel 
training in previous jobs k. Training in previous jobs is summarized over k = 1, 
…, j-1. 
Xi are various background variables which are specific for the individual 
(e.g. gender, place of birth). 
Xij are various background variables which may vary with the nature of the 
job (for example the size of the company). 
XijT are background variables for an individual i in a job j and at a point in 
time T (e.g. marital status and place of residence). 
γT is a specific effect of the period of employment T’s impact on the wage 
which is identical for all individuals i and all jobs j (tenure effect). 
µi are specific effects for the individual i not covered by X and P, and which 
may be assumed to be constant over time (individual fixed effects). 
Vij are matching-specific effects on wage which depend on how well the 
individual i fits into the job j. 
εijT are other effects on wage over time not covered by X. 
 
The expected signs for parameter estimates for the five theoretical models 
above are summarized in Table 8. In Column 1, we see that ongoing training is 
expected to have a negative impact on pay in all models, with the exception of 
Model 5, in which pay is not affected by ongoing training since the employer 
                                                      
 
31 See for example Loewenstein & Spletzer (1999a).  
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pays the entire cost of training. In Models 2-4, the employer pays part of the 
cost and, as a result the estimated αT is expected to be greater in Model 1. 
Column 2 shows that all models predict a pay increase as a result of previous 
personnel training in the same job. This effect, however, is expected to be 
greatest in Model 1, in which the employer receives the entire return. In other 
models, the parties share the return. Column 3 shows the effect on wage of 
training in a previous job. In Models 1, 2 and 5, training is of a general nature, 
which results in identical or higher pay with a new employer. In Model 3, with 
specific training, there is no expected effect, while in Model 4, with some 
specific training, the expected wage increase is less than in the other models. 
It is difficult to draw a line between the various models in empirical studies 
since the nature of training programmes (general or specific) and the market 
(perfect or imperfect competition) may vary over time. 
 
Table 8 Expected values for parameter estimates in the pay equation 






value for αt, 
t = 1,…, T-1 
(3) 
Expected 
value for δ 
1  Perfect competition, 
general training 
- *  + *  + 
2  Perfect competition, 
general training, 
credit restrictions 
- + + 
3  Perfect competition, 
specific training 
- + 0 
4  Perfect competition, 
specific and general 
training 
- +  +  ** 
5  Imperfect 
competition, 
general training 
0 + + 
* Greater expected effect than other models 
** Less expected effect than other models 
 
5.3  Wage during ongoing personnel training 
Empirical tests of the impact of personnel training on wage during the training 
period may be based on data concerning the employee’s initial rate of pay. Let 
Wijl be the initial wage for individual i who starts the job j at timepoint T = 1. In 
this case, Models 1-4 predict that α1 < 0, while Model 5 results in α1 = 0. The 
problem in estimating α1 is due to unobserved variables. It is reasonable to  
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assume, for example, that the employee’s general talents and abilities are not 
fully covered by the variables in X. Individuals with greater ability will tend to 
have a higher initial wage, and the employer will tend to invest in more training 
for individuals with greater ability. As a result, there is a positive correlation 
between µi and Pij1 in equation (1). If we take this into account, the estimates 
for α1 will be positively biased.
32 
 
The literature describes three methods of correcting this measurement error: 
(i)  Ability-proxy variable, which identifies the individual’s hidden hetero-
geneous characteristics via variables that are positively correlated with 
the individual’s abilities. 
(ii)  Position fixed-effect, identifying differences in the impact of personnel 
training on pay between different jobs (vij in equation (1)). 
(iii)  Individual fixed-effect, which identifies the impact of personnel training 
on pay via the variation in training over time for individuals in a panel 
data set. 
 
5.3.1 The  ability-proxy  variable 
The simplest analysis is based on cross-section data. As a result, the empirical 
model is simplified to: 
 
Wi =  i i ij i i X X P ε γ β β α + + + + 2 1 ,  i = 1,…, n.     (2) 
 
In order to reduce the bias of α, an attempt is made to control for non-
observable employee characteristics by including variables in X which may be 
assumed to be positively correlated with these hidden characteristics. Barron, 
Berger & Black (1996) analyse data from EOPP and SBA in which the em-
ployer reports training for the average new employee, including a variable in Xij 
indicating the complexity of the job. The idea is that the most talented 
employees are matched with the most complex tasks. A variable in Xij is also 
introduced, indicating the number of hours the employer devoted to 
interviewing and investigating each applicant for the vacant position. A longer 
search process indicates that the job is more complex and demanding. The 
                                                      
 
32 See Barron, Black & Loewenstein (1989).  
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additional variables result in negative and significant estimates of α in both 
EOPP and SBA. The elasticity is limited, however – the elasticity with the 
highest value in absolute terms does not exceed -0.018. In addition, the 
parameter estimates for external personnel training (off-site training) are 
significantly positive, which contradicts the theoretical predictions. 
Veum (1999) uses data from NLSY 1996 based on annual interviews with 
younger men and women in the labour force. Here too, a negative estimate of α 
is discerned, but this is not significant. Only personnel training outside the 
workplace which is not financed by the employer produced significant negative 
estimates at a 10% level. 
Hence, analysis of cross-section data appears to be unable to provide robust 
empirical support for human capital theory and Models 1-4. At the same time, 
this weak support may be explained by the fact that the “better” employees are 
not covered by the variables in Xij. As a result, matching for jobs with more 
training and higher initial pay will continue to produce skewed parameter 
estimates. 
 
5.3.2 Position-fixed  effect 
An alternative method of analyzing cross-section data is based on matching 
theory. When recruiting new personnel, the employer is looking for people who 
fit the job well. This means that each job will be matched with employees who 
have specific characteristics that fit the job concerned. As a result, the variation 
in the initial pay and personnel training for two individuals with the same job 
may be assumed to be devoid of hidden heterogeneity. In other words, 
information from the variation in personnel training between various jobs is not 
utilized. Instead, the impact of training on initial pay is identified via the 
variation in training for new employees for a given job. 
The variation in the job can be arrived at in different ways. Sicilian (2001) 
uses EOPP, in which the employer supplies information about two new 
employees for the same job. Since two different people are observed, their 
individual hidden heterogeneity will continue to be present. The assumption 
that the employer tries to employ two people with the same abilities and 
characteristics for a specific post reduces the skew in the parameter estimate, 
however. The difference in training and pay between these two new employees 
presumably depends on factors other than their hidden heterogeneity. Hence, 
the empirical Model (1) is modified to become: 
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Wij =  ij j i ij i ij v X X P ε γ β β α + + + + + 2 1 ,     i = 1, 2,  j = 1,…, J         (3) 
 
In a comparison with (1), we note that the hidden position-specific effect is 
assumed to be the same for the two new employees, vij = vj, i = 1.2. By 
transforming the variables into the difference between the two observations for 
new jobs, we arrive at: 
 
W2j – W1j =   
( ) () ( ) ( ) ( ) j j j j j j X X X X P P 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 ε ε γ γ β β α − + − + − + − + − . 
 
This first-difference regression results in an estimate of α as -0.048 at a 1% 
level of significance. In accordance with this model, 100 hours of personnel 
training – the average value in the data – will reduce initial pay by almost 5%
33. 
Barron et al (1999a) employ a similar method to estimate the impact of 
personnel training on initial wage, using data from the National Assessment of 
Vocational Education (NAVE). Instead of stating training and initial pay for 
two employees in the same job, in NAVE the employer provides the 
corresponding information for the most recent employee and for the “typical” 
employee (the typical worker) in this post. Regression analysis of the differ-
rences between the most recent employee and the typical employee indicates an 
elasticity of -0.016. In other words, the effect is less than in Sicilian’s study. 
Barron et al (1999b) use SBA data to compare the proportion of the most 
recent employees who have higher pay and less training than the “typical” 
employee, and vice-versa. This shows that only a small proportion (1.5%) of 
the most recent employees who received less personnel training than the typical 
employee had lower pay. In this case, the comparison is consistent with Models 
1-4. However, lower pay was only noted for 6.8% of the most recent 
employees with more training than the typical employee. Hence, employers 
appear to be less willing to reduce pay for new employees who receive more 
training, which does not comply with Models 1-4. 
 
                                                      
 
33 When Sicilian (2001) takes into account the stated degree of personnel training, the effect 
varies between 4% and 12%  
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5.3.3 Individual  fixed-effect 
A third method of checking for hidden employee heterogeneity is using panel 
data to check for individual fixed-effects. In this case, it is assumed that the 
individual’s hidden qualities are covered by µi in (1) so that εijT is not correlated 
with the independent variables. If we take the difference between two points in 
time for each individual in the data set, we arrive at the pay equation: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 3 1 − − − − − + − + − + = − ijT ijT T T ijT ijT ijT T ijT ijT X X P W W ε ε γ γ β α .       (4) 
 
Hence, the individual fixed effect µi is eliminated in equation (4). The job 
matching-specific effect vy is also eliminated, providing the individual does not 
change jobs between the two timepoints T and T-1. However, this means that it 
is not possible to use the initial wage to arrive at wage during ongoing training. 
Instead, a separate variable Pijt is used, indicating whether training was 
underway at the timepoint for data collection. 
Loewenstein & Spletzer (1998) use this method for the analysis of NLSY 
panel data in the period 1988-1991. In order to determine whether participants’ 
wage was lower during ongoing training, they introduced a variable in Pijt 
which indicates the marginal effect on pay if training was not completed by the 
date of response to the questionnaire. If the parameter estimate for this effect 
was negative, this meant that wage declined during the training period. 
However, it proved that only “seminars outside the workplace” resulted in a 
negative parameter estimate (-0.0907), which does not differ significantly from 
zero. In addition, the proportion of uncompleted personnel training was 
relatively small, so the results should be cautiously interpreted. 
The Loewenstein & Spletzer study may be compared with a previous study 
by Lynch (1992) who was looking for a corresponding effect in the NLSY 
cross-section in 1983. Lynch found that people with a low level of education 
(Less than the school degree) received lower pay during ongoing training in the 
workplace, but that this did not apply to better-educated employees. This might 
mean that the former category received more general training, and paid this 
cost in the form of a lower wage. 
To summarize, only one study (Sicilian, 2001) clearly supports Models 1-4. 
Other studies indicate that the employer at least participated in financing the 
general training, which is consistent with both Model 2 and Model 5 in Table 8. 
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5.4  Wage increases in the same job 
Increased pay in the same job may be classified under two headings or 
components: the period of employment (seniority) and performance/quailfica-
tions. There is extensive literature which discusses increased pay as a result of 
the first component: wage may increase as the length of employment increases 
in order to provide an incentive for the employee to do his/her best and not to 
shirk, since the employee’s expected pay increase will cease in the event of 
dismissal
34. Wage can also be maintained at a lower level and gradually 
increased in order to attract employees who do not intend to resign after a brief 
period of employment
35. A third explanation for increased wage in line with 
seniority is that good matching between employees and jobs leads to longer 
employment and higher levels of pay
36. 
There are divided opinions about the importance of personnel training for 
pay increases due to seniority. According to Models 3 and 4 in Table 7, wage 
increases due to seniority occur because no value is attached to specific per-
sonnel training in other workplaces. As a result, someone who stays at the same 
workplace for some time will receive a greater pay increase than someone who 
often changes jobs. Hence, the empirical prediction is that a pay increase due to 
seniority will be higher if specific training occurs. However, several studies 
indicate that personnel training is not one of the main reasons for increased pay 
due to seniority. Barth (1997), using data from the 1989 Norwegian Survey of 
Organizations and Employees (NSOE) found a significant negative correlation 
between the job’s training requirements and increased pay due to seniority for 
specific know-how. And in a sample of companies in the US and Japan, Levine 
(1993) found that companies with high wage increases on the grounds of 
seniority did not have more personnel training than average. However, one 
explanation may be that the training was general and took place in the initial 
stages of employment. In Sweden, Regnér (2002) indicates that, based on LNU 
cross-section data, training increases the employee’s level of pay, but that 
increased pay is not linked to seniority
37.  According to Regnér, one possible 
                                                      
 
34 See Lazear (1981). 
35 See Salop & Salop (1976). 
36 See Jovanovic (1979). 
37 Pay increases due to seniority tend to be modest in the Nordic countries.  
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explanation is that personnel training reflects the impact of promotion on wage, 
and that personnel training in Sweden may be employed as a tax-free benefit. 
As in the Norwegian study, the questionnaire addressed to employees makes a 
distinction between general and specific training. It indicates that general l 
training has a greater impact on the level of wage than specific training, which 
is consistent with Models 1 and 3 in Table 8. In addition, the impact on wage of 
general training is greater for men in the private sector than for women in the 
public sector. 
One key question is whether the data for personnel training is of sufficiently 
good quality to provide accurate estimates of the impact of tenure and training 
on increased wage rates. Loewenstein & Spletzer (1999a) discuss the question 
of whether the lack of data about informal training in surveys based on 
individuals leads to biased estimates of (γT – γT-1) and αT in equation (4). They 
use the 1993 and 1994 NLSY surveys, which include a measure of informal 
training. They find that the inclusion of information about informal training in 
PijT in (4) reduces the parameter estimate of the tenure effect (γT – γT-1) by a 
third, and the parameter estimate of αT by a fifth. For example, an isolated wage 
increase due to long employment declines between the first and second years of 
employment from about 3.6% to approximately 2.5% if informal personnel 
training is included in equation (4), and the isolated wage increase due to 
formal personnel training declines between the first and second years of 
employment from about 5.5% to 4.6%. The pay increase due to informal 
training is about 3.3%, and hence the total pay increase for employees who 
received training during the second year of employment is about 10.4%. The 
wage increases declines drastically for employees with more than two years of 
tenure. 
Bartel (1995) applies an alternative strategy to improve the quality of the 
data, by analysing a specific major company’s personnel database, thus 
eliminating errors due to the inability of individuals to recall previous training 
periods and the variation in the need for personnel training in various 
occupational fields. Formal training in a company often only lasts for a couple 
of days
38. As a result, NLSY, which measures personnel training in terms of 
                                                      
 
38 This can also be seen in the Swedish AKU survey. Wallette (2004) reports that in the case of 
employees who participated in personnel training during the previous 6 months in the period 
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weeks, may miss many shorter training programmes. Bartel considers that there 
continues to be a selection problem in (4) since (εijt - εijt-1) may be correlated 
with the probability of receiving personnel training in period T. The company 
can monitor the employee’s performance over time and train employees whom 
the employer wishes to promote. Alternatively, the employer can provide 
training for employees whose performance has deteriorated. This source of bias 
of αT can be corrected by estimating an instrumental variable for PijT which is 
not correlated with (εijt - εijt-1). In this case, Bartel uses information about the 
individual’s pay in relation to comparable colleagues in the company. This 
indicates that employees with relatively high wages receive management and 
technical training, while employees with relatively low rates of pay receive 
personal development training (enhancement of oral performance, stress 
management, conflict management, etc.). Regression analysis based on the 
instrumental variable for personnel training indicates that training has a 
significantly positive impact on increased wage. 
 
5.5  Wage increases in connection with a change of 
employer 
Increased wage following a change of job or employer is influenced by (i) 
cumulative training in the previous workplace, (ii) the extent to which the new 
employer attaches value to this training, and (iii) the way in which the 
matching between the employee and the new employer changes, in comparison 
with the previous matching. 
Assuming T – 1 years of employment before a change of employer, the 
wage increase for the first year of employment T will result in the following 
modification of (4): 
 
() ( )
() () ( ) 1 1 1 1




− − − −




− + − + − +
− + − + + − = − ∑
T ij ijT ij ij T T
T ij ijT ij ij ij
T
t
t ij t ijT T T ij ijT
v v
X X X X P P P W W
ε ε γ γ
β β δ α α
 (5) 
                                                                                                                                 
 
1995-2000, 46.9 had a training period of 1-2 days and 32.1% had a training programme which 
lasted 3-5 days.  
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Thus, the matching-specific effect (vij – vij-1) is not eliminated, as in the case of 
pay increases in the same job. Loewenstein & Spletzer (1998) show that this 
biases the parameter estimate of δ towards zero, resulting in an underestimate 
of the impact of previous training on increased wage in the event of a job-
change, irrespective of whether this impact is positive or negative. The intuitive 
explanation is that specific training with the previous employer has a negative 
impact on increased pay, and hence we may expect δ<0 for a specific training 
Pij-1. The matching with the new employer must improve if the employee is 
nonetheless prepared to change jobs, and this means that (vij – vij-1) > 0. If this 
aspect is ignored, the regression estimate of δ will be systematically greater – 
in other words biased towards zero. On the other hand, if training with the 
previous employer was of a general nature, the parameter estimate will result in 
δ > 0. As a result, employees with general training can systematically change 
jobs with a less satisfactory matching, and this means that (vij – vij-1) < 0. The 
regression estimate of δ will once again be skewed towards zero. 
However, the skewing of δ towards zero in (5) means that a significant 
parameter estimate of δ  will provide a clear indication that training in the 
previous workplace influences pay in the next job. This provides opportunities 
for testing whether the return on general training is shared between the 
employer and the employee. Loewenstein & Spletzer used NLSY 1988-1991 to 
compare the wage increase attributable to training with another employer with 
training that took place under the current employer’s auspices. This showed 
that “seminars outside the workplace” and “business schools, vocational 
schools, etc.” arranged by a previous employer resulted in a 10-15% higher 
wage increase than the corresponding training provided by the current 
employer. As a result, training outside the workplace – which is often of a 
formal and general nature - provides a higher return for the employee if a 
previous employer has financed the training. This may be a sign that the 
employer receives part of the return from general personnel training. On the 
other hand, since training in the workplace may be assumed to be more specific 
than training which takes place elsewhere, this is an indication that the 
employer receives a proportion of the return on general personnel training. 
Booth & Bryan (2002), using BHPS data for the period 1998-2000 and the 
fixed-effect model, also conclude that general training provided by a previous 
employer has a greater impact on pay than training provided by the current 
employer. General training with a previous employer increases wage by 7.5%,  
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while the occurrence of training with the current employer increases pay by 
2.4%. 
Goux & Martin (2000) point out that there are two hidden selection 
mechanisms that must be taken into account in the wage equation. Firstly, 
selection of employees for personnel training is presumably dependent on the 
employee’s hidden characteristics, which are also correlated with the level of 
wage (cf the selection problem during ongoing personnel training). Secondly, if 
the employer considers that the employer is highly likely to resign after 
training, the probability of receiving training will presumably diminish. If the 
employee’s propensity to resign also affects his/her rate of pay, estimates of the 
payoff as a result of participation in training will be biased. Using French data 
(FQP) which permits matching of the employee and the workplace, they were 
able to identify two selection equations for participation in training and for 
changing employers after training. When estimating a wage equation (pay level 
1992) to check the two hidden selection mechanisms, they found no significant 
impact on wage as a result of participation in training during the previous four 
years. On the other hand, an estimate of the wage equation without this 
selection check resulted in 5% higher wage as a result of participation in 
training. This result indicates that the major proportion of the pay differential 
between employees who have, and who have not, received training is due to 
hidden characteristics for employees who have received training. 
 
5.6  The impact of a compressed wage structure 
In a labour market with imperfect competition, the employee’s market wage 
may increase more slowly than his/her productivity in the workplace con-
cerned, due to the employer’s stronger negotiating position. The pay structure 
becomes squeezed with regard to the employee’s productivity and skills. If the 
employer finances general personnel training, training will increase more if the 
wage structure is compressed. If, on the other hand, the employee finances 
general training, training will decline if the wage structure is compressed. 
This prediction has been tested at the empirical level to some extent. 
Bassanni & Brunelo (2003) use the ECHP survey to investigate the way in 
which compressed pay structures in the EU affect the incidence of personnel 
training. The degree of compression is measured by calculating the difference 
between the median wage increase for employees with, and without, training 
during the previous year. There is a significant negative correlation between 
this variable and participation in general training, where general training is  
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approximated to training outside the workplace. This result supports the thesis 
that general training is financed by the employer.  
Almedia-Santos & Mumford (2004) use linked data for workplaces and 
employees in Britain, and use the ratio of the 90
th percentile wage to the 10
th 
percentile wage in the workers’ wage distributions as a measure of wage 
compression. They find that wage compression is positively related to both 
training incidence and training duration. In contrast to these studies, Ericson 
(2004) cannot find any positive relation between the same measure of wage 
compression and training based on data from the Swedish AKU. 
The fact that the distinction between general and specific training differs in 
the three studies might partially explain the different results. Bassanini & 
Brunello approximate general training as training outside the workplace while 
specific training is defined as training at the workplace. Almeida-Santos & 
Mumford do not distinguish between general and specific training, while 
Ericson uses a direct question to the workers whether training was “mainly 
general” or “mainly specific”. 
  
5.7  The impact of a wage floor 
The United States has institutional regulation which affects the volume of 
personnel training in the form of legislation which establishes a pay floor for 
new employees. According to fundamental human capital theory, a wage floor 
reduces training since the employee is not allowed to reduce his/her pay to the 
extent required to defray the cost of general personnel training
39. As a result, 
the presence of a wage floor should inhibit wage growth, in comparison with 
similar jobs with no wage floor. Leighton & Mincer (1981) and Hashimoto 
(1982) have also found empirical support that this is the case. Lazear & Miller 
(1980), however, concluded that it is not certain that higher initial pay and a 
lower rate of wage growth really prove that training has declined. Lazear 
(1979), for example, predicts a slower wage increases in a situation involving 
high initial wages since long-term employment contracts take into account the 
employee’s incentive to perform well.
40 In addition, a wage floor may 
                                                      
 
39 See for example Rosen (1972) and Hashimoto (1982) 
40 Low initial pay is compensated by a steeper wage increases to reward and encourage a high 
level of endeavour on the employee’s part throughout his/her working life.  
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encourage a longer school education and, in its turn, this augments the increase 
in productivity resulting from training.
41 
So far, there are a limited number of studies on the correlation between 
wage floors and the incidence of training, and the results are not conclusive. 
Using EOPP data, Grossberg & Sicilian (1999) found that employees with a 
wage floor had slower wage growth, but they could not demonstrate that this 
was due to less training. Acemoglu & Pischke (1999c) presented theoretical 
arguments explaining that a wage floor should, in point of fact, increase 
personnel training, based on a model with friction and rigidity in the wage 
process. The employer profits from the difference between the employee’s 
productivity (MPt) and the employee’s level of pay (Wt). If the employer’s 
profit MPt  – Wt increases after training, the employer will have an incentive to 
invest in training. In this case, the wage floor established the prerequisites for 
an increased MPt – Wt differential since wage is constant if the wage floor 
constitutes a binding restriction. As a result, training leads to increased MPt , 
but a constant Wt. The employee, who has no incentive to reduce his/her pay in 
order to receive l training, will therefore receive more training if there is a 
wage floor. Acemoglu & Pischke find empirical support for this theory, based 
on NLSY data, and this also applies to Arulampalam, Booth & Bryan (2003), 
based on BHPS data. However, using CPS data, Neumark & Wascher (2001) 
find support for the alternative theory under which a wage floor reduces 
training in current employment. 
 
5.8  The impact of trade union membership 
Trade union membership may result in a more compressed wage structure, and 
may therefore result in more or less personnel training
42. Empirical studies of 
the impact of union membership of personnel training provide different 
messages. Duncan & Stafford (1980) (PSID) and Barron et al (1987b) (EOPP) 
conclude that employee union membership reduces training in the US. On the 
other hand, Booth (1991) (BSAS) concludes that union membership resulted in 
increased training in the UK. Based on data from the 1989 British labour-force 
survey, Green (1995) finds that union membership increases personnel training 
                                                      
 
41 See, for example, Agell & Lommerud (1997). 
42 See section 2.4  
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in companies with less than 25 employees, but had no impact in larger 
companies. Kennedy, Drago, Sloan & Wooden (1994) indicate that training 
increased in Australia, but only if the union appeared to play an active role in 
negotiations with the employer. Boot et al (2003) use BHPS data, in which they 
find that men covered by union collective agreements are more likely to receive 
training, and that they receive a higher return in the form of wage increases 




This review of the literature in the field has discussed some of the many ques-
tion marks in connection with studies of personnel training. We have noted that 
the research normally takes human capital theory as its starting point, and also 
its predictions regarding employees’ pay. 
Personnel training may be studied from two different perspectives. Funda-
mental human capital theory is based on the employee’s incentive to invest in 
his/her own human capital, and relegates the employer to a role as a passive 
actor in a competitive labour market. The employee is the party that takes the 
initiative for general training, since only the employee can obtain any return in 
the form of higher future income. When training is specific, the employer has 
more initiative and interest in the realization of training. In this case, the parties 
have a relationship based on equality, in the knowledge that their alternative 
return outside the employment contract is limited, due to a competitive labour 
market. An alternative perspective has been developed more recently in 
connection with attempts to explain why employers also pay for general 
training. This institutional approach focuses, instead, on the employer’s 
incentive structure. In a labour market with imperfect competition, and with 
institutions which maintain various regulations in the labour market, it is shown 
that the employer has considerable interest in, and influence on, the extent and 
organization of training. 
In the case of empirical research into the impact of personnel training on 
wage rates, it appears that the latter point of view has the widest support. The 
impact on wage during the training period is not sufficiently negative to lead 
one to expect that the employee will pay for the training. The impact on pay 
after the conclusion of training is less for the current employer than for new  
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employers, and this indicates that the current employer receives part of the 
return from general training. 
However, it is not possible to determine definitively which of these two 
approaches should be rejected, and perhaps this would not be desirable. The 
labour market extends over a wide range of different occupations and situations 
which make varying demands on skills development and organized personnel 
training. The employee’s motives for training may be a crucial factor in some 
jobs, while the employer’s motives may be the most important factor in other 
jobs. Theoretical models should indicate the way in which the initiative for 
training varies between the parties involved in the labour market under 
different circumstances. 
In addition, in order to investigate the way in which personnel training is 
initiated and implemented, the empirical analyses need to be extended to ensure 
that details concerning the employee’s workplace and the employer are 
included in the independent variables. This will permit closer study of the 
extent to which training affects the company’s productivity, and of the 
correlation between higher productivity and pay increases. Matching company-
based and individual-based data will probably be a key strategy for the future 
in this research area. 
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